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In this paper, it is argued that women’s limited access to organizational power structures 
is a constituent part of the explanation of gender wage inequality. Multi-level analyses 
conducted on a comprehensive Swedish data set combining information on a large 
number of private sector employers and all their employees confirm that 
establishments’ gender wage gaps are wider the stronger the male representation among 
organizational decision-makers, net of individuals’ human capital and various 
organizational features relevant for wage setting. Theoretical explanations focus on 
gender unequal outcomes of i) general rules and policies decided at higher 
organizational levels, and ii) everyday decision-making and daily interaction between 
superiors and their subordinates. On basis of the empirical results, we conclude that 
gender wage inequality is to a substantial degree driven by everyday decision-making in 
organizations. It seems as if close supervisors’ decisions and suggestions about wage 
rates, promotions, internal training et cetera are to some extent based on personal 
preferences, loyalties, and contacts that are not gender neutral.  
   





The sociological literature on labor markets has increasingly directed its attention 
towards the significance of organizations and employers in creation of gender inequality 
in job rewards (see Reskin, McBrier, and Kmec 1999 for a review). Some researchers 
have pointed out that studies of labor market inequality ought to take into consideration 
the role played by those actors who have direct influence over organizational procedures 
and policies, that is, managers and supervisors (Marini 1989, Baron 1991). However, 
empirical research has not yet put much effort into scrutinizing in what ways gender 
inequalities in access to organizational power influence gender wage differentials. In 
this paper, we argue that women’s limited access to organizational power structures is a 
constituent part of the explanation of gender wage inequality.
1 Using a comprehensive 
Swedish data set combining information on a large number of private sector employers 
and their whole body of employees in 1995, we investigate whether establishments’ 
gender wage gaps are wider the stronger the male representation among organizational 
decision-makers. 
Presumably, the scarcity of data combining detailed information on 
multiple workers in a large set of organizations is one of the reasons behind the 
conspicuous lack of studies addressing the question if and how gender differences in 
access to organizational power influence gender wage inequality. Recently, a U.S. 
employer-employee matched data set was used to analyze effects on wage differentials  
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of sex segregation and racial segregation at the establishment level (Carrington and 
Troske 1998, Bayard et al. 1999). However, to the best of our knowledge, multi-worker 
and multi-establishment data sets have not yet been used for exploring the role of 
organizational decision-makers in processes creating and sustaining gender wage 
inequality. Shenhav and Haberfeld (1992) and Hultin and Szulkin (1999) have 
investigated a similar research problem, however not on the kind of data used in the 
current article. Shenhav and Haberfeld’s study, based on data from 1972-1973 pertaining 
to establishments in the Detroit area, lacked direct measures of individuals’ wages and 
of other individual-level characteristics like education and seniority. Instead, authors 
used aggregate information on occupational earnings and sex composition to calculate 
weighted sex earnings ratios at the establishment level. Their results indicated that 
gender differences in occupational earnings are more narrow the higher the proportion 
of female managers within the establishment. Hultin and Szulkin used a Swedish 
nationally representative data set including only one employee per establishment in 
1991. The authors found that women who work in establishments in which relatively 
many of the managers and supervisors are men have lower wages than have women with 
similar qualifications and job requirements, but who work in establishments with larger 
proportions of women among decision-makers. 
Given the extensive character of the employer-employee information that 
we have at our disposal, we can both overcome some of the problems built into the 
studies mentioned above and extend earlier research in several ways. First, we can  
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estimate the effect on the gender wage gap of gender differentiated access to 
organizational power hierarchies net of individuals’ human capital and certain relevant 
organizational features. Second, we can, at least to some extent, deal with the potential 
objection that an empirical outcome confirming our main assumption is contaminated by 
sorting processes implying that some organizations for some reasons attract and retain 
female – or male – employees with especially high productive capacities. Third, we are 
able to analyze at which specific organizational authority level the studied 
discriminatory process is mainly generated. 
 
BRING THE BOSSES AND THEIR UNDERLINGS IN!
2 
Around two decades ago, Baron and Bielby urged social scientists studying labor market 
stratification to ”bring the firm back in” (Baron and Bielby 1980: 738). Yet, much 
theoretical and empirical work still needs to be done in order to reveal in what ways 
circumstances within establishments influence workers’ chances and rewards (c.f. 
Reskin, McBrier, and Kmec 1999), and how ascriptive characteristics like gender 
become important lines of cleavages in distributive conflicts over scarce rewards within 
organizations. 
Analysts within the field of organizational demography have stressed that 
processes generating inequality should be investigated in terms of the numerical 
strength of various demographic categories within organizations (Pfeffer and Davis-
Blake 1987, Pfeffer 1989). Various social and demographic groups within work  
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organizations take an interest either in initiating and sustaining or in undermining and 
abolishing ascriptive considerations in reward distribution processes (Baron 1991, 
Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). According to the minority power argument, a subordinate or 
minority group’s power grows with its proportion of the total stock of labor within an 
organization (c.f. Pfeffer 1989, see also Kanter 1977). However, this strong version of 
the minority power argument is contradicted by results from a number of empirical 
studies on gender inequality, showing that both women and men’s rewards are relatively 
low in organizational milieus in which many women work (e.g. Groshen 1991a, 
Carrington and Troske 1998). 3 
As proposed by, for example, Shenhav and Haberfeld (1992), one should 
distinguish between a group’s size in general and its representation in positions of power 
in particular. In order for a certain group, however large, to be able to state its claims and 
prosper in reward distribution processes, it needs to have at its disposal the strength 
emanating from representation in strata endowed with decision-making power (see also 
Cohen, Broschak, and Haveman 1998). This argument is also of central importance for 
feminist perspectives in which it is claimed that unwarranted gender differences in 
rewards arise primarily due to men’s desire and ability to preserve their advantages in 
distributional processes (e.g. Reskin 1988, Acker 1992). One important prerequisite for 
this ability ought reasonably be organizational power in terms of command over rules 
and procedures that may serve the purpose of distributing valued resources in favor of 
the favored.  
   
  Mechanisms of inequality 
 
7
Below, we elaborate two potential explanations to why the gender wage gap 
is wider the stronger the male representation among organizational decision-makers. 
The first explanation is primarily based on the idea that the gender wage gap within 
organizations is in part a result of general rules and policies decided at higher 
hierarchical levels. The second explanation above all involves everyday decision-making 
and daily interactions between superiors and their underlings. 
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Organizational decision-makers and gender wage inequality 
The way in which general organizational rules and policies are designed may render 
inequality in opportunity between different groups of workers. It has been claimed that 
ascriptive gender stereotypes embedded in organizational structures contribute to 
unequal reward distribution in the labor market (e.g. Baron 1991). Hence, organizational 
policies and procedures may entail negative consequences for women as a group, 
irrespective of individual women’s capabilities and preferences. For instance, allocation 
processes within firms are to some extent influenced by stereotyped beliefs on what 
constitutes ”women’s jobs” and ”men’s jobs” (Milkman 1987, Reskin and Padavic 
1988). Bielby and Baron’s prominent empirical research on sex segregation in the labor 
market has indicated that employers tend to reserve some jobs for men and some jobs 
for women (e.g. Bielby and Baron 1986). 
Examples from the literature witness that positions mainly filled by women 
tend to be excluded from lucrative internal labor market arrangements, even in 
establishments with an otherwise high potential for career advancement. le Grand, 
Szulkin, and Tåhlin (1994) showed that male employees in internal labor markets face a 
relatively steep seniority wage profile, while this effect is absent for female employees. 
DiPrete and Soule (1988) found that women’s internal job ladders compared to men’s in 
general are shorter and more seldom reach over higher-level barriers. Such gendered 
promotion structures quite evidently convey gender wage inequality, since wage growth 
is often brought about by upward shifts of positions.  
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The fact that men and women rarely share job positions implies a scope for 
employers’ devaluation of work that is predominantly performed by women, although the 
value of this work resembles that of predominantly male tasks. This kind of 
discrimination is often referred to as comparable worth discrimination (Treiman and 
Hartmann 1981). Once gender differentiated mobility schemas or pay rates are set, the 
normal functioning of the organization – or ”business as usual” – tends to maintain the 
status quo and continues to ensure further inequality in reward systems (c.f. Blau, Ferber, 
and Winkler 1998). Research shows that the gender structure of existing ordinal ranking 
of jobs in organizations’ pay systems tends to be very resistant to change and is seldom 
subject to transposition (c.f. Acker 1989; 1990, Kim 1989). Hence, both sex labeling of 
jobs and relative pay rates within organizations show a good portion of inertia once 
established (Bielby and Baron 1986). 
Power over general organizational policies is an important tool for 
creating, sustaining, and modifying allocation routines and reward structures within 
establishments. There are reasons to believe that female and male managers tend to use 
their decision-making power differently, in ways that in turn may render substantial 
consequences for women’s relative wages within work organizations. Reasonably, 
female managers are less prone than their male counterparts to allocate in a routine 
manner women to typically female jobs. Also, female decision-makers should be more 
apt to extend promotion opportunities for positions predominantly filled by women, for 
instance by creating “bridge” positions through which employees can switch ladders  
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more easily (Reskin and Padavic 1994). Furthermore, female decision-makers are 
presumably more attentive than their male counterparts in terms of observing and valuing 
typically female work, thereby minimizing comparable worth discrimination.  
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Empirical research supports the notion that female managers in general are 
less inclined than their male counterparts to initiate and sustain institutionalized gender 
discriminatory practices. For example, establishments with relatively many female 
managers are less sex segregated than otherwise comparable establishments (Baron 
1991, Baron, Mittman, and Newman 1991, Cohen, Broschak, and Haveman 1998). 
Furthermore, female decision-makers have been found to be more prone than their male 
confrères to take an active part in measures aimed at establishing employment equity at 
the workplace (Baron 1991). Female leaders are presumably also more willing than their 
male counterparts to adjust work arrangements so that they become more compatible 
with women’s in general extensive family responsibilities, for example by allowing 
flexible working hours and by keeping overtime work and inconvenient working hours to 
a minimum.  
We argue that organizational decision-makers have influence over how 
general systems of opportunity are designed within establishments and that the sex 
composition among these actors in turn influences the advancement and reward chances 
for women as a group. In work organizations in which there are no or only a few women 
in power positions, gender may go on being a prominent category that implies negative 
consequences for women placed in lower organizational strata (c.f. Ely 1995, Cohen, 
Broschak, and Haveman 1998). 
 
It takes two to tango: an interaction perspective on gender wage inequality  
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Decision-making in organizations does not revolve around general rules and procedures 
only, however. Also accounted for existing systems of opportunity within 
establishments, people in authority positions directly influence who will get ahead in the 
reward distribution by making decisions and giving suggestions about individual 
subordinates’ wages. In the previous section, we argued that gender bias may influence 
the design and perpetuation of within-firm systems of allocation and wage setting 
decided at high organizational levels. But individual employees’ success in these 
opportunity structures is also, at least in part, governed by daily decisions made by 
people in charge. Managers’ and supervisors’ power over reward allocation can also be 
manifested outside the actual wage-setting process. Employees’ chances for internal 
career mobility and selection of individuals to more qualified positions, to training 
programs et cetera are, at least in part, governed by daily decisions made by 
organizational superiors. To the extent that minor everyday decisions concerning 
individual employees’ opportunities are systematically gender biased, they generate 
gender inequality in outcome in the long run. 
The hitherto attention devoted to the deeds of organizational decision-
makers gives us only at most half of the picture of organizational actors’ impact on 
reward distribution processes. It has been argued that systems of advantage and 
disadvantage are embedded in everyday interactions between superordinate and 
subordinate groups (Bielby 1987). Bridges (1989) claims that wage setting processes in 
work organizations are characterized by continuous interactions and negotiations  
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between organizational actors who represent different interests (see also Acker 1991). 
Hence, it seems called for to pay attention also to female and male supervisees’ 
opportunities to mobilize power resources in work organizations. Some arguments and 
results originating from the social network approach are relevant in this context. There 
is strong evidence that essential resources are embedded in social networks and that 
access to networks promotes favorable outcomes in reward allocation processes (see 
Lin 1999 for a review). Empirical studies show that social relations affect income 
attainment (Bridges and Villemez 1986, Boxman, De Graaf, and Flap 1991, Simon and 
Warner 1992) and chances for upward mobility (Burt 1995). Social networks in work 
organizations also offer informal support systems (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998) that 
in turn may enhance employees’ reward opportunities. 
The social network literature has furthermore demonstrated the impact of 
demographic and social criteria like sex and ethnicity on the occurrence of social 
contacts and on individuals’ centrality in networks. According to the similarity attraction 
paradigm (Byrne 1971, see also Tajfel 1982), closer social ties primarily emerge among 
people with similar basic characteristics. Social similarity tends to evoke attraction and 
acts as a mechanism for resolving uncertainty (c.f. Pfeffer 1989, Reskin and McBrier 
2000). Social proximity to those actors who occupy central network positions enhances 
individuals’ or groups’ exchange opportunities and thus strengthen their bargaining 
power in reward distribution processes (c.f. Granovetter 1988, Hedström, forthcoming). 
For instance, when there is ambiguity as regards who is the most suitable candidate for a  
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certain vacant position, decision-makers tend to minimize risk by choosing the person 
who is most socially similar to them (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
In concordance with the similarity attraction paradigm, it has been found 
that both men and women tend to interact within sex-segregated networks in 
organizations (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987). There are good reasons to believe 
that superiors’ minor everyday decisions on who will benefit in reward distribution 
processes and who will obtain access to career opportunities are influenced by 
interaction in social networks. Given the sex segregated nature of professional 
networks, it seems reasonable to assume that individual female supervisees face greater 
reward opportunities and receive more support for their claims in workplaces where the 
female representation in central positions, i.e., among decision-makers, is relatively 
high. 
 
WAGE SETTING PROCESSES IN SWEDEN 
There are reasons to believe that the impact of organizational characteristics on earnings 
is smaller in Sweden than in many other Western countries. When analyzing the specific 
features of the Swedish labor market, observers have emphasized the high degree of 
institutionalization and regulation (Edin and Holmlund 1995, Edin and Topel 1997). The 
most prominent feature mentioned in this context is that wages from the mid 1950s to 
the early 1980s were determined to a large extent through centralized collective 
bargaining at the national level. A solidaristic wage policy aiming at equal pay for equal  
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work, regardless of the profitability and productivity of the firm or industry, has been 
widely pursued. This policy had the explicit purpose of minimizing wage variation 
between equal jobs across firms and sectors. The very high union coverage rate in 
Sweden in combination with a well organized and, until recently, highly centralized 
confederation of employers facilitated implementation of a solidarity wage policy. This 
policy resulted in a decrease of the overall wage dispersion in the Swedish labor market 
(Hibbs 1991). 
Recent studies have demonstrated that centralized wage bargaining 
produces relatively small wage inequalities in general (Barth and Zweimüller 1995, Blau 
and Kahn 1996, Elliott and Bender 1997) and small gender wage differentials in 
particular (Hammond and Harbridge 1995). The centralized wage bargaining process in 
Sweden, with the aim of raising the relative wages of low -wage workers, may indirectly 
have resulted in a relatively small wage gap between women and men. Empirical findings 
from international comparisons show that a society’s overall wage inequality is 
positively related to the gender wage gap. The Swedish labor market is characterized by 
relatively low wage dispersion and, hence, comparatively small wage differentials 
between women and men (Rosenfeld and Kalleberg 1990, Blau and Kahn 1992). 
However, even during the regime of centralized bargaining, a far from negligible 
adjustment of wages occurred at the firm level in the form of wage drift. 
Thus, the scope for wage dispersion across and within firms for similar 
kinds of jobs was relatively limited in Sweden until the beginning of the 1980s. Since  
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then, consensus around the solidarity wage policy has been undermined. The national 
confederation of employers has adopted new policies aimed at determining wages at the 
firm level, while the trade unions’ attitudes towards such decentralization have been 
mixed. This new situation has resulted in a decentralization of wage negotiations, which 
has given more latitude for local agreements. Nevertheless, the egalitarian character of 
wage formation in Sweden is still relatively strong by international standards. In sum, the 
assumption here is that the scope for wage discrimination against women in the Swedish 
labor market is comparatively small, but still remains. The impact of discriminatory 
practices applied at the level of the firm as revealed by our analysis of Swedish data may 
accordingly be viewed as a conservative estimate of their importance in other Western 
labor markets. 
  
   




In the empirical analyses in this paper, we combine information on employers and 
employees in a large number of Swedish private sector organizations. The data set has its 
origin in the 1991 Swedish Establishment Survey, a national probability sample of 2 135 
private and public sector employers.
4 Information pertaining to all employees in these 
organizations in 1995 has been collected from a variety of registers. The crucial 
independent variable is the sex composition of establishments’ managerial and 
supervisory staff. Since data on individuals’ position in the organizations’ hierarchical 
structures are only available for the private sector, public sector organizations have been 
excluded from the sample. There are 593 private organizations in the Swedish 
Establishment Survey sample for which there is accessible information on employees’ 
position in the organizational hierarchical structure and in which both men and women 
work. For reasons discussed below, we perform separate analyses for white-collar and 
blue-collar employees. The number of organizations studied is 317 for blue-collar 
employees. These organizations together employ 82 190 blue-collar workers. 
Correspondingly, we include 546 organizations that employ 74 960 white-collar 
workers. 290 of all studied organizations employ both blue-collar and white-collar 
workers. 
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VARIABLES AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
The variables in the analyses are both on an individual and on an organizational level. 
Individuals’ earnings are measured as the logarithm of monthly full-time equivalent pre-
tax earnings. The data sources for individual earnings are registers from the Swedish 
Employers Confederation, the Swedish Trade Union Organization, and Statistics Sweden. 
Individuals’ education refers to the total number of years of formal schooling. For 
employees who finished their secondary education after 1972, we have information on 
the grade point average from this education. Seniority measures the number of years that 
the employee has worked in the establishment. This variable is left-censored, since data 
are only available from 1986 onwards. The source of data on education and seniority is 
Statistics Sweden. Labor market experience is an indirect measure of the number of years 
that the individual has been in employment, estimated through records of old-age 
pensions credits from the Swedish National Insurance Board. The experience variable 
represents the number of years from 1960 onwards during which the employee has had 
an income qualifying for old-age pension.
6 To take curvilinear effects into account, we 
include a square term of experience in the analyses. 
The information on whether employees hold a white-collar or a blue-collar 
occupation has been derived from the wage registers mentioned above. Data on skill level 
of jobs are available for white-collar occupations only. A trisect variable indicating the 
normal skill required for a given job was derived from the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). For the first category of jobs, a first-level  
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secondary education is required. The second skill category includes jobs that require 
post-secondary education. Finally, we distinguish jobs that demand a university degree. 
Information on jobs’ skill levels was obtained from the Swedish Employers 
Confederation. 
The natural logarithm of the number of employees in the establishment, the 
proportion of women among blue-collar and white-collar employees, respectively, and 
organizations’ industry are all variables on the organizational level.
6 The data source for 
these variables is Statistics Sweden. The crucial variable at the organizational level is the 
proportion of male managers and supervisors of all managers and supervisors in the 
establishment. Employees who have as their full-time responsibility to guide others’ 
work are classified as managers or supervisors. On the basis of ISCO-88 occupational 
codes together with additional data from the Swedish Employers Confederation, we are 
able to distinguish between managers and supervisors, that is, between decision-makers 
at higher and at lower hierarchical levels. Accordingly, we can calculate the total 
proportion of male decision-makers in the establishment as well as the proportion of 
male managers and male supervisors, respectively. 
It is important to note that the variable measuring the proportion of male 
managers and supervisors is highly skewed. Table A1 in Appendix gives descriptive 
statistics for blue-collar workers and the establishments that employ them. The average 
proportion of male managers and supervisors in the blue-collar sample is 0.89. In 148 
establishments of 317, there are no female managers or supervisors at all. In 4  
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establishments, there are no male decision-makers. Descriptive statistics for white-
collar workers and their establishments are given in Table A2 in Appendix. The average 
proportion of male managers and supervisors in the white-collar sample is 0.87. In 285 
establishments of 546, there are no female decision-makers at all. The number of white-
collar establishments with no male decision-makers is 12. Male decision-makers are 
concentrated to relatively large organizations, to organizations with low proportions of 
female employees, and to industries such as manufacturing and construction. Thus, high 
proportions of male managers and supervisors tend to be found in labor market locations 
characterized by relatively high wages. Consequently, we expect to find a positive main 
effect on organizations’ mean wage levels of the proportion of male managers and 
supervisors. However, our assumption is that this association is not of a causal nature, 
but rather brought about by certain organizational characteristics that we are in part able 
to control for. Hence, we take it that the proportion of male managers and supervisors 
does not per se increase organizational wage levels. The causal question at hand is 
instead whether the gender wage gap is wider in organizations with many male decision-
makers than in other organizations, given organizational mean wage levels. 
The data set is made up by information both on individual employees and on 
the organizations in which they work. The appropriate statistical method for dealing with 
information of such a hierarchical kind, with individual employees nested in work 
organizations, is multilevel modeling (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). Multilevel models 
estimate within-organizational and between-organizational equations simultaneously,  
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accounting for potential dependence between observations within organizations. The 
formal representation of the estimated models is given below. 
 
Level-1, within-organizational model: 
lnwageij = B0j + B1j*WOM ij + B2*EXPij + B3* EXPSQij +B4*SENij + B5*EDUCij + Rij  (Equation 
1) 
 
The level-1 model, or within-organizational model, estimates individual wages within 
each organization. B0j is the intercept for organization j and B1j represents the gender 
wage gap for organization j. Thus, both the intercept and the estimate for the gender 
wage gap are allowed to vary between organizations. B2 through B 5 are fixed parameters 
for employees’ human capital and are not allowed to vary between establishments. All 
fixed parameters are centered around their grand means. Rij is the level-1 random 
variance, or each individual’s unique contribution to the outcome. The random variance 
is assumed to be normally distributed.  
   
  Mechanisms of inequality 
 
22
Level-2, between-organizational model: 
B0j = G 00 + G 01* PROPMALEBOSSj + U0j        (Equation 
2) 
B1j = G 10 + G 11* PROPMALEBOSSj + U1j        (Equation 
3) 
 
The level-2 model, or between-organizational model, is built up by two separate 
equations. Equation 2 estimates organizational wage levels, or more formally, the 
variation between organizations in intercepts (B0j). G00 represents the average wage level 
in organizations in which there are no male managers and supervisors, G01 is the 
regression coefficient for the effect of the proportion of male managers and supervisors 
on the organizational wage level, and U0j is the random variation in wage levels between 
establishments. In equation 3, the gender wage gap (B1j) is the outcome. G10 is the 
average gender wage gap in organizations in which there are no male managers and 
supervisors, G11 is the regression coefficient for the effect of the proportion of male 
managers and supervisors on the gender wage gap, and U1j is the random variation 
between establishments in gender wage gaps. 
Our primary interest is to explore the influence on the gender wage gap of 
the sex composition of establishments’ managerial and supervisory staff, net of 
individuals’ human capital and certain organizational features relevant for reward 
allocation processes. We perform the analyses separately for blue-collar and white-
collar employees, since there are reasons to believe that wage setting processes differ  
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between these two categories of employees. Moreover, the earnings data for blue-collar 
and white-collar employees have been collected from different sources. The empirical 
analyses are conducted only for those male and female employees who lack managerial 
or supervisory responsibilities themselves. 
In the first stage of the analysis, we estimate the effect on the gender wage 
gap of the proportion of male managers and supervisors, net of human capital (that is, 
G11 in the level-2 model defined in equation 3 above) for blue-collar and white-collar 
employees, respectively. In additional models, we let organizational size, the proportion 
of female employees in the establishment, and industry have an impact on organizational 
wage levels.
7 The rationale for this alternative model specification is that wages tend to 
be relatively low in smaller establishments and in establishments with relatively high 
proportions of female employees, and that wage-levels vary by industry. 
In the next analytical stage, we deal with the possible objection that an 
observed relationship between the proportion of male decision-makers and the gender 
wage gap is generated by unmeasured selection processes, meaning that particularly 
talented workers are allocated to certain establishments. Ability-sorting processes have 
been extensively discussed by labor economists as one explanation of wage differences 
(e.g. Groshen 1991b). In our case, ability sorting processes would imply that some 
organizations for some reasons attract and retain female – or male – workers with 
especially high productive capacity. Thus, these organizations would eventually be 
imprinted both by relatively high proportions of women in decision-making positions  
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and by relatively high wages for female supervisees. The data set makes it possible to 
consider the influence on the outcome of potential selection processes of this kind. For 
employees who finished their secondary education after 1972, we have information on 
the grade point average from this education. To the extent that ability-sorting processes 
influence the effect of the sex composition among decision-makers on the gender wage 
gap in organizations, the relationship should be substantially reduced when secondary 
school results are included in the equations.8 
In a final analytical stage, we examine more thoroughly the role played by 
managers and supervisors in wage setting processes in organizations. Our main 
assumption is that the gender wage gap is wider in organizations in which there are 
relatively many male managers and supervisors. This assumption is in turn based on the 
straightforward premise that people in authority positions influence employees’ wages 
either in a direct way by making decisions and giving suggestions about subordinates’ 
wage rates, or indirectly by influencing selection of employees to potentially lucrative 
career slots et cetera. However, all decision-makers do not decide about all employees’ 
rewards. The Swedish Employers Confederation’s definition of a supervisor is a person 
carrying out full-time responsibility for work conducted by blue-collar employees. By 
this definition, supervisors do not exert influence over white-collar employees’ wages. 
Accordingly, an observed significant relationship between the sex composition among 
supervisors and the gender wage gap for white-collar workers would seriously question 
the validity of our measures of hierarchical authority. For blue-collar workers, however,  
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both managers and supervisors potentially play a substantial role in the wage 
determination process. In this case, an assessment of at which hierarchical level the 
analyzed discrimination process mainly takes place enables us to empirically evaluate 
the two main theoretical arguments distinguishing between consequences for reward 
allocation of general policy making and of daily decisions, respectively.  
   




General models of the effect on the gender gap 
of the proportion of male managers and supervisors 
Table 1 gives results from six hierarchical linear models (HLM), estimating the effect 
of the sex composition in organizational power structures on gender wage gaps in 
organizations. Models 1 to 3 are estimated for blue-collar employees and Models 4 to 6 
are estimated for white-collar employees. Models 1 and 4 are baseline models that give 
the variance between establishments in gender wage gaps, given employees’ human 
capital. In Models 2 and 5, the proportion of male managers and supervisors is included 
as predictor. In Models 3 and 6, establishment size, the proportion of female blue-collar 
and white-collar employees in the establishment, and industry are added to the second-
level equation for organizational wage levels. This means that these variables are allowed 
to influence organizational wage levels (i.e., the intercept in the equation). 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
Models 1 and 4 in Table 1 show that the average gender wage gap, as well as the variance 
in gender wage gaps between organizations, is more than twice as large for white-collar 
as for blue-collar employees, given employees’ human capital.
9 In Models 2 and 5, it is 
shown that the effect of the proportion of male managers and supervisors on the gender 
wage gap is negative and significant, which means that the gender wage gap is wider in  
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establishments with higher proportions of male decision-makers. The connection 
between the proportion of male decision-makers and the gender wage gap seems to be of 
about the same magnitude for blue-collar and white-collar employees. For blue-collar 
employees, the average gender wage gap in establishments with no male managers and 
supervisors (G 10) is approximately zero. The corresponding figure for white-collar 
employees is about -0.07. The estimated effect on the gender gap of the proportion of 
male decision-makers (G11) is about -0.11 for both blue-collar and white-collar workers. 
The inclusion of the proportion of male decision-makers reduces the between-
establishment variance in gender wage gaps with about 8 percent for blue-collar 
employees and 10 percent for white-collar employees. We obtained these values 
through subtracting from 1 U1j in Model 2 divided by U1j in Model 1, and U1j in Model 5 
divided by U1j in Model 4, respectively.
10 
One should notice that there is a strong positive main effect of the 
proportion of male managers and supervisors on organizational mean wage levels for 
blue-collar employees (Model 2 in Table 1). For white-collar workers, this effect is of 
considerably lower magnitude and does not meet conventional requirements for 
statistical significance. Thus, the analyses have so far supported the assumption that 
women’s relative wages are pressed down in establishments with relatively many male 
decision-makers, but the effect is partly moderated by the condition that wage levels are 
relatively high in establishments in which there is a strong representation of men in the 
power structures. This is especially true for blue-collar employees.  
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As mentioned above, our expectation is that the positive main effect of the 
proportion of male managers and supervisors on mean wage levels should disappear, or 
at least diminish, when other organizational characteristics relevant for average wage 
levels are controlled for. This expectation holds as far as blue-collar employees are 
concerned. A comparison between Models 2 and 3 in Table 1 shows that the relatively 
strong positive main effect of the proportion of male managers and supervisors on mean 
wages becomes substantially reduced and statistically insignificant when organizational 
size, proportion of female employees, and industry are controlled for (Model 3). 
Controlling for these organizational characteristics does not influence the positive main 
effect of the proportion of male decision-makers on mean wage levels for white-collar 
workers. The main effect is practically of the same magnitude in Model 5 and Model 6 
and remains just below the significance requirements. Furthermore, the association 
between the proportion of male decision-makers and organizational gender wage gaps 
remains almost unchanged for both blue-collar and white-collar workers after 
organizational characteristics are accounted for (Models 3 and 6). Thus, the detrimental 
influence of men’s representation among managers and supervisors on women’s relative 
wages exists net of organizational size, proportion of female employees, and industry.
11 
In order to validate further the results, we performed a number of additional 
analyses. First, we allowed the fixed parameters for employees’ human capital in the 
level-1 model to vary across establishments.
12 The results from this analysis (not shown) 
indicated that the effects of human capital on earnings exhibit significant variation  
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between establishments. More interesting given the focal question in this study, 
however, is that the relationship between the proportion of male decision-makers and 
the wage gap remained unaltered with this model specification (i.e., compared to the 
results given in Model 3 and Model 6 in Table 1). Second, we estimated the potential 
influence on the crucial relationship of the level of skill by adding jobs’ skill 
requirements to the level-1 equation for white-collar employees (results shown in Table 
A3 in Appendix). Controlling for skill level reduced the effect of the proportion of male 
managers and supervisors both on the gender wage gap and on organizational mean wage 
levels. However, the effect on the gender gap remained strong, indicating that the 
proportion of male decision-makers in establishments influences the gender wage gap 
also accounted for the process by which equally educated and experienced male and 
female white-collar employees are sorted to job positions with different skill 
requirements. 
Furthermore, we examined the possibility of nonlinear effects of the 
proportion of male decision-makers on the gender wage gap. In order to allow for a 
curvilinear relationship, we categorized the original interval measure of the proportion 
of male managers and supervisors into three dummy variables. The first category 
included establishments with 0 to 67 percent male decision-makers, the second category 
included establishments with 68 to 99 percent male decision-makers, and the third 
category consisted of establishments with an all-male management. An analysis 
including this trisect classification (results not shown) rendered results that were in  
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essence the same as those given by the analyses in which the interval sex composition 
variable was used. In a final extension of the analysis, we examined whether the crucial 
relationship could be driven by relatively small establishments with very few employees 
of each sex. An analysis performed on a sample of organizations with at least ten white-
collar or blue-collar workers of each sex confirmed the findings given in Table 1. 
The results presented in this section strongly indicate that the sex 
composition in power structures within organizations has a substantial influence on the 
gender wage gap. The relationship seems straightforward for both blue-collar and white-
collar employees. We have seen that some of the models reveal positive main effects of 
the proportion of male managers and supervisors on organizational wage levels. 
However, these effects are – at least after controls for organizational characteristics 
related to mean wage levels – relatively weak and insignificant, indicating that female 
employees in general benefit from working in establishments with a relatively strong 
female representation among managers and supervisors. In the next section, we elaborate 
the analyses further in order to deal with the possibility that the findings are 
contaminated with bias due to ability sorting processes. 
 
Accounting for potential ability selection bias 
Table 2 provides results from analyses in which we examined potential influence of 
ability sorting bias by accounting for employees’ grade point average from secondary 
school. However, the strategy with including average grades in the models reduces one  
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kind of selection bias, simultaneously introducing another. Data on grade point average 
are available only for employees who finished their secondary education after 1972. 
Hence, the organizations for which we are able to test the influence of ability sorting 
processes are characterized by a relatively low average age among employees. The 
exclusion of older employees means that the analyses including average grades are 
conducted for a subsample of about 50 fewer organizations and 50 000 fewer employees 
compared to the full blue-collar sample, and 100 fewer organizations and 45 000 fewer 
employees compared to the full white-collar sample.
13 
The fact that the subsamples analyzed in Table 2 are substantially reduced 
compared to the full samples analyzed in Table 1 calls for a thorough investigation of the 
effect of the proportion of male decision-makers on the gender wage gap. Model 1 
(blue-collar workers) and Model 3 (white-collar workers) in Table 2 include the same 
predictors as the full sample models (Models 3 and 6 in Table 1). Average grades are 
added in Model 2 (blue-collar workers) and Model 4 (white-collar workers) in Table 2. 
For blue-collar workers, the impact of the proportion of male managers and supervisors 
on the gender wage gap is somewhat weaker in the subsample compared to in the full 
sample (compare the estimates in Model 1 in Table 2 with those in Model 3 in Table 1). 
The essential relationship remains practically unaltered when average grades are 
included in the individual equation for blue-collar employees (Model 2 in Table 2). 
Thus, as far as blue-collar workers are concerned, the effect of ability sorting processes  
   
  Mechanisms of inequality 
 
32
does not dismantle the support for the main assumption that restricted female access to 
organizational power structures has a detrimental effect on women’s relative wages. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
For white-collar employees, the impact of the proportion of male decision-makers on 
the gender wage gap is reduced by more than a half in the subsample as compared to in 
the full sample (compare the estimates in Model 3 in Table 2 with those in Model 6 in 
Table 1). When average grades are included in the individual equation for white-collar 
employees (Model 4 in Table 2), it turns out that the influence of the proportion of male 
managers and supervisors on the gender wage gap is only marginally reduced. The 
remaining effect on the wage gap is statistically significant also with this model 
specification. Thus, the influence on the crucial relationship of ability sorting processes 
seems to be relatively limited also for white-collar workers. 
In sum, it seems as if ability sorting processes are not a hidden mechanism 
behind the observed finding showing that women’s relative wages are depressed the 
more men are represented in organizational power structures. At the same time, the 
results presented in Table 2 indicate that the examined discrimination process is of a 
lower magnitude in the subsample than in the full sample. We can of course not 
completely rule out the objection that selection processes are involved in producing the 
observed relationship between the proportion of male decision-makers and the gender  
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wage gap. However, the conducted test has provided good reasons to believe that the 
studied mechanism of discrimination is of substantial importance for processes 
generating gender wage differentials in the labor market. 
 
The role of decision-makers at different hierarchical levels 
In this section, we try to specify levels of authority at which gender inequality in 
financial rewards are generated and sustained. We do this by distinguishing between the 
role played by higher-level decision-makers (managers) and lower-level decision-
makers (supervisors), respectively, in the wage discrimination process. The analyses 
below include only those establishments for which there is information on the sex 
composition among both managers and supervisors. Again, the number of establishments 
analyzed becomes substantially reduced compared to the full sample. The main reason 
behind the sample reduction is that there by definition are no supervisors in 
organizations that employ white-collar employees only. In addition, the number of 
organizations becomes reduced due to the fact that some (mostly small) organizations 
with both white-collar and blue-collar employees have failed to report to the Swedish 
Employers Confederation the necessary information on individuals holding supervisory 
positions. 
The results presented in Table 3 indicate that decision-makers at 
hierarchical levels relatively close to their subordinates are important actors in the 
processes generating gender wage differentials among supervisees. As can be seen from  
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Model 1, the gender wage gap among blue-collar employees widens with the proportion 
of male supervisors, while the effect on the gap of the proportion of male managers is 
non-existing for this category of employees. Correspondingly, Model 2 shows that the 
gender wage gap is relatively wide for white-collar employees in organizations with a 
relatively strong male dominance among managers, while there is no effect on the gender 
gap of the proportion of male supervisors. One should also note that the main effects on 
average wage levels of the proportion of male managers and supervisors, respectively, 
are not significant in the analyses presented in Table 3. This indicates that the 
discrimination process apparently dominates over the main effect of the proportion of 
male decision-makers on wages. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
Our results have given support to the idea that organizational processes generating 
gender wage differentials can be traced mainly to those hierarchical levels at which daily 
interaction between subordinates and decision-makers takes place. However, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that also general decision-making contributes to gender 
inequality in reward distribution processes. In order to reach a more clear-cut 
conclusion for white-collar workers in this respect, we ought to be able to distinguish 
between managerial positions involving responsibility for general policies on the one 
hand, and responsibility for white-collar workers’ daily work on the other hand. This kind  
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of data is however not available. Thus, without rejecting the idea that general decision-
making at high organizational levels may have an impact on gender wage inequality, we 
conclude that inequality is to a substantial degree driven by everyday decision-making in 
organizations. Close supervisors’ decisions and suggestions about wage rates, 
promotions, internal training et cetera may, at least to some extent, be based on personal 
preferences, loyalties, and contacts that are not gender neutral. Such an interpretation 
seems reasonable in light of the results indicating that the sex composition among 
supervisors matters for the gender wage gap among blue-collar workers, whereas the sex 
composition among managers matters for the gender wage gap among white-collar 
workers. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The point of departure in the analyses presented in this paper was the idea that power 
relations in work organizations are of crucial importance for understanding how gender 
inequalities in financial rewards are generated and sustained in the labor market. If 
gender wage differentials are to be explained in terms of discrimination, employers and 
other decision-makers in work organizations ought reasonably to be important actors in 
the process leading to women obtaining inferior rewards for their performance in the 
labor market. Although a number of scholars have emphasized the potential role played 
by employers and other organizational decision-makers in processes generating gender 
inequality in the labor market, very few empirical studies have scrutinized in what ways  
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gender-differentiated access to organizational power influences gender wage 
differentials. 
Our analyses conducted on a comprehensive Swedish employer-employee 
matched data set covering a large number of private sector organizations and their 
employees clearly demonstrated that organizational gender wage gaps are wider the 
larger the representation of men among managers and supervisors, accounted for 
supervisees’ human capital and for organizational size, industry, and overall sex 
composition. Analyses including average grades from secondary education pointed in 
the direction that the observed relationship between sex composition among decision-
makers and the gender wage gap cannot be explained in terms of ability selection 
processes. Clearly, women have particularly low relative wages in establishments in 
which there are no women or only a few women in positions of power. We believe that 
this finding supports the idea that the reward structure in the labor market to some extent 
reflects men and women’s relative power within work organizations. 
We have provided arguments from structural discrimination theories and 
the social network approach to why the sex composition among organizational decision-
makers matters for the size of the gender wage gap. According to the first argument, 
organizational decision-makers exert power over general policies and thus have the 
capacity to either initiate and sustain or to undermine institutionalized gender bias in 
reward distribution processes within organizations. It was argued that male 
organizational decision-makers are more inclined than their female counterparts to  
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sustain gender bias in reward distribution processes, for example by allocating typically 
male jobs to internal labor markets and by leaving typically female jobs outside such 
potentially lucrative career arrangements. On the contrary, female managers are due to 
self-interest, solidarity or loyalty with other women reasonably more willing to set aside 
discriminatory policies. The second theoretical argument focuses on consequences for 
gender wage inequality of daily decisions influenced by interaction between decision-
makers and their underlings. We argued that female supervisees have better 
opportunities to benefit from network contacts and to establish their claims in 
negotiations and conflicts over scarce resources in organizations in which relatively 
many of the decision-makers are women. Female subordinates should be advantaged 
when other women are an integral part of the organization’s power structure, because 
interaction is facilitated by gender similarity between actors. 
These two perspectives can be analytically translated into the question what 
hierarchical proximity vs. distance between decision-makers and subordinates means for 
organizational processes generating gender wage inequality. The data material enabled us 
to empirically distinguish between the sex composition among managers (i.e., high-level 
decision-makers) and among supervisors (i.e., lower-level decision-makers). We found 
that the gender wage gap for blue-collar workers seems to be more affected by the sex 
composition among close supervisors than by the sex composition among more 
hierarchically distant managers. On basis of this single result, however, we are reluctant 
to dismiss the hypothesis derived from well-founded structural theories stating that  
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general policies adopted at higher organizational levels are important mechanisms 
behind gender inequality in the labor market. But the idea that a substantial fraction of 
the gender wage gap has its explanation in gendered daily interactions and decision-
making at lower hierarchical levels within establishments has no doubt survived an initial 
empirical inquiry. Important tasks for future research lies in trying to shed more light on 
this issue and in corroborating our main results in an international context. Although 
confined to a single country, the findings are no doubt suggestive. The contention that 
female employees in general benefit from working in establishments with a relatively 
strong female representation in power structures received strong support. This is, we 
believe, an important contribution to the analysis of mechanisms generating gender 
inequality in the labor market.  
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TABLE 1. HLM-coefficients from regression models of between-organizational variance in gender wage gaps predicted by the proportion of 
male managers and supervisors, the proportion of female employees, industry, and human capital. Blue-collar employees and white-collar 
employees separately. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Blue-collar employees  White-collar employees 
      MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5  MODEL 6 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL, FIXED EFFECTS: 















(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  0.0012 











**  -0.0009  -0.0009  -0.0009 
(0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0008) 
 
ESTABLISHMENT-LEVEL EFFECTS: 
Intercept  9.5647  9.3833  9.4952  9.8824  9.8283  9.8143 
(0.0072)  (0.0355)  (0.0473)  (0.0058)  (0.0324)  0.0338 
Proportion of male managers and supervisors  0.2017
**  0.0357  0.0610  0.0637 




  (0.0053)  (0.0031) 
Proportion of female employees  -0.1444
**  -0.0092 
  (0.0253)  (0.0284) 
Control for industry    No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
     
Gender wage gap  -0.0744




  (0.0039)  (0.0195)  (0.0201)  (0.0043)  (0.0224)  (0.0228) 
Proportion of male managers and supervisors*    -0.1096
**  -0.1120
**    -0.1171
**  -0.1178
** 
gender wage gap    (0.0214)  (0.0220)  (0.0253)  (0.0256) 
 
RANDOM EFFECTS: 
Variance in intercepts U0j  0.0152  0.0139  0.0094  0.0146  0.0146  0.0139 
Variance in gender wage gap U1j  0.0026  0.0024  0.0025  0.0057  0.0051  0.0052 
Individual-level variance Rij  0.0205  0.0205  0.0205  0.0412  0.0412  0.0412 
Number of organizations  317  317  317  546  546  546 
Number of individuals  82190  82190  82190  74960  74960  74960 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
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*p £ 0.05 
**p £ 0.01 
TABLE 2. HLM-coefficients from regression models of between-organizational variance in gender wage gaps predicted by the proportion of 
male managers and supervisors, the proportion of female employees, industry, human capital, and average grades. Blue-collar employees and 
white-collar employees separately. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___ 
      Blue-collar employees  Blue-collar employees  White-collar employees  White collar employees 
  MODEL 1    MODEL 2    MODEL 3    MODEL 4 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL, FIXED EFFECTS: 
Years of education  0.0004  0.0003    0.0555
**    0.0497
** 
  (0.0014)  (0.0013)    (0.0017)    (0.0016) 
Experience  0.0190
**  0.0191
**    0.0415
**    0.0448
** 
  (0.0020)  (0.0020)    (0.0018)    (0.0018) 
Experience squared/100  -0.0612
**  -0.0615
**    -0.0821
**    -0.0909
** 
  (0.0060)  (0.0067)    (0.0053)    (0.0050) 
Seniority  0.0113
**  0.0113
**    -0.0001    0.00005 
  (0.0012)  (0.0012)    (0.0011)    (0.0010) 
Average grades    0.0025        0.0584
** 
    (0.0021)        (0.0030) 
ESTABLISHMENT-LEVEL EFFECTS: 
Intercept  9.3771  9.3776    9.8157    9.8224 
  (0.0648)  (0.0647)    (0.0314)     (0.0307) 
Proportion of male managers and supervisors  0.0278  0.0282    -0.0051    -0.0058 
  (0.0488)  (0.0488)    (0.0330)     (0.0323) 
Lnsize  0.0316
**  0.0315
**    0.0117
**    0.0121 
  (0.0056)  (0.0056)    (0.0033)     (0.0032) 
Proportion of female employees  -0.1416
**  -0.1415
**    -0.0444    -0.0462 
  (0.0280)  (0.0280)    (0.0305)     (0.0301) 
Control for industry    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Gender wage gap  0.0209  0.0206    -0.0814
**    -0.0971
** 
  (0.0252)  (0.0251)    (0.0219)     (0.0219) 
Proportion of male managers and supervisors*  -0.0873
**  -0.0872
**    -0.0552
*    -0.0512
* 
gender wage gap  (0.0273)  (0.0272)    (0.0243)     (0.0243) 
RANDOM EFFECTS: 
Variance in intercepts U0j  0.0087  0.0087    0.0098    0.0099 
Variance in gender wage gap U1j  0.0020  0.0020    0.0030    0.0032 
Individual-level variance Rij  0.0211  0.0211    0.0323    0.0313 
Number of organizations  268  268  443  443  
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Number of individuals  31662  31662  29507  29507 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______ 
*p £ 0.05 
**p £ 0.01  
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TABLE 3. HLM-coefficients from regression models of between-organizational variance in gender wage 
gaps predicted by the proportion of male managers and male supervisors, the proportion of female employees, 
industry, and human capital. Blue-collar employees and white-collar employees separately. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
      Blue-collar employees  White-collar employees 
      MODEL 1    MODEL 2 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL, FIXED EFFECTS: 
Years of education  0.0023
**  0.0535
** 




  (0.0012)  (0.0014) 
Experience squared/100  -0.0277
**  -0.0423
** 
  (0.0026)  (0.0025) 
Seniority  0.0096
**  -0.0003 
  (0.0010)  0.0009 
 
ESTABLISHMENT-LEVEL EFFECTS: 
Intercept  9.5351  9.8553 
  (0.0679)  (0.0480) 
Proportion of male managers  0.0207  0.0417 
  (0.0583)  (0.0444) 
Proportion of male supervisors  -0.0367  0.0014 




  (0.0061)  (0.0040) 
Proportion of female employees  -0.2144
**  -0.0356 
  0.0347)  (0.0437) 
Control for industry  Yes  Yes 
 
Gender wage gap  -0.0148  -0.0687 
  (0.0357)  (0.0381) 
Male managers*  -0.0089  -0.1057 
gender wage gap  (0.0328)  (0.0389) 
Male supervisors*  -0.0675
**  -0.0085 
gender wage gap  (0.0287)  (0.0294) 
 
RANDOM EFFECTS: 
Variance in intercepts U0j  0.00760  0.0094 
Variance in gender wage gap U1j  0.00232  0.0037 
Individual-level variance Rij  0.02092  0.0402 
Number of organizations  215  289 
Number of individuals  75975  52456 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
*p £ 0.05 
**p £ 0.01  
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TABLE A1: Descriptives for individual-level and organizational-level variables. Blue-collar employees only. 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. deviation  Min. value  Max. value  N. 
Monthly wages, SEK  15 208.67  3 110.40  3 671.00  41 009  82 190 
           
Experience  17.89  10.52  0.00  36.00  82 190 
           
Seniority  6.56  3.25  0.50  9.50  82 190 
           
Educational years  10.23  1.87  7.4  20.0  82 190 
           
Proportion of male 
managers and 
supervisors 
0.89  0.19  0.00  1.00  317 
           
Proportion of female blue-
collar employees 
0.33  0.25  0.01  0.94  317 
           






TABLE A2: Descriptives for individual-level and organizational-level variables. White-collar employees only. 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. deviation  Min. value  Max. value  N. 
           
Monthly wages, SEK  19 767.16  7 223.16  5 450.00  343 986.80  74 960 
           
Experience  21.56  9.77  0.00  36.00  74 960 
           
Seniority  5.27  3.50  0.50  9.50  74 960 
           
Educational years  12.96  2.87  7.40  20.00  74 960 
           
Proportion of male 
managers and 
supervisors 
0.87  0.22  0.00  1.00  546 
           
Proportion of female 
white-collar employees 
0.44  0.19  0.01  0.98  546 
           
Organizational size  307  638.63  3  7 005  546 
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TABLE A3. HLM-coefficients from regression models of between-organizational 
variance in gender wage gaps predicted by the proportion of male managers and 
supervisors, the proportion of female employees, industry, human capital, and skill- 
level. White-collar employees only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
________________________________________________________________ 
      White collar employees 
      MODEL 1 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL, FIXED EFFECTS: 
Years of education  0.0368
** 
  (0.0014) 
Experience  0.0269
** 
  (0.0008) 
Experience squared  -0.0398
** 
  (0.0017) 
Seniority  -0.0013 
  (0.0008) 
Skill level 2  0.0854
** 
  (0.0066 
Skill level 3  0.2514 
  (0.0102) 
 
ESTABLISHMENT-LEVEL EFFECTS: 
Intercept  9.7444 
  (0.0282) 
Proportion of male managers and supervisors  0.0238 
  (0.0285) 
Lnsize  0.0062
** 
  (0.0029) 
Proportion of female employees  -0.0209 
  (0.0277) 
Control for industry  Yes 
 
Gender wage gap  -0.0831
** 
  (0.0199) 
Proportion of male managers  -0.0735
** 
and supervisors*gender wage gap  (0.0226) 
 
RANDOM EFFECTS: 
Variance in intercepts U0j  0.0110 
Variance in gender wage gap U1j  0.0041 
Individual-level variance Rij  0.0357 
Number of organizations  546 
Number of individuals  73057 
________________________________________________________________ 
*p £ 0.05 
**p £ 0.01  
   




                                                                   
1 Borjas (1996) has traced the oldest documented and quantified gender wage differential to the Old Testament: 
The Lord spoke to Moses and said, Speak to the Israelites in these words. When a man makes a special vow to the Lord 
which requires your valuation of living persons, a male between twenty and fifty years old shall be valued at fifty silver 
shekels, that is shekels by the sacred standard. If it is a female, she shall be valued at thirty shekels (Leviticus 27: 1–4). 
Hence, the female-male wage ratio (with a rough control for age) prescribed by the Lord is 0.6. Our interpretation 
of the Biblical quotation is that it gives the first known illustration of the negative influence on women’s wages 
of the overrepresentation of men among organizational decision-makers. 
2 The heading paraphrases Stolzenberg’s article “Bringing the Boss Back In” (1978). 
3 The opposite majority power argument (Blalock 1967) suggests that minority groups that grow numerically pose 
a threat to majority groups, who in turn react by triggering off discriminatory practices against minority group 
members. 
4 The probability of selection in this survey was proportionate to the number of employees in the establishment. 
An establishment is defined as a workplace that has one single address and one single employer. For a 
presentation of the Swedish Establishment Survey, see le Grand, Szulkin and Tåhlin (1995).  
5 This measure does not allow us to distinguish between income from wages and income from other sources, 
such as various public welfare programs. However, our measure is probably more reliable than the often used 
indirect measure that estimates experience by subtracting from age the number of years of schooling together 
with the age at which one enters compulsory school. Such a measure tends to overestimate labor market 
experience for women who have interrupted their labor market careers for child-care. 
6 The classification of industries is “Standard för svensk näringsgrensindelning (SNI) 1992” (see Statistics 
Sweden 1992:6). This classification follows the EU “Nomenclature Générale des Activités dans les Communautés 
Européennes”. We have collapsed industries into eleven broad categories, namely engineering; other 
manufacturing; construction; trade, hotel, and restaurant; transportation, post, and telecommunication; financial 
business and related services; other business services; other private services; health care; research and 
development; and culture, sport, recreation, and voluntary organizations. 
7 The first equation in the level-2 model is then expanded in the following way: 
B0j = G 00 + G 01* PROPMALEBOSSj + G02* PROPWOMENj + G03* lnSIZE j + Goi￿ INDi + U0j.  
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8 Another possible selection bias is accounted for in the first category of models, in which we allow the 
intercepts for organizational mean wage levels to vary. If highly productive female (or male) employees were 
systematically allocated to certain organizations, these organizations should be characterized by high wage 
levels compared to organizations with a more normal distribution of talent among employees. 
9 Overall, the effects of the human capital variables on earnings are the expected. However, one should notice 
that the effect of seniority on earnings is weak and negative for white-collar employees. The potential positive 
effect of seniority on wages may be counteracted by the positive effect of external job shifts for this category of 
employees. Without access to data on effects of external shifts on earnings, we cannot estimate seniority effects 
in a correct way (Topel 1991, le Grand and Tåhlin 1998).  
10 The estimated effects of the proportion of male decision-makers on the gender wage gap can be calculated by 
substituting values from Model 2 and Model 5 into equation 3 for the level-2 Model. 
11 It should be mentioned that we have performed a formal statistical test to prove that the negative effect on 
female employees’ relative wages is stronger in absolute terms than is the positive effect on overall mean wages 
of the proportion of male managers and supervisors in establishments. It turned out that the sums of the former 
effect and the latter effect for blue-collar workers (-0.112 + 0.036) and for white-collar workers (-0.118 + 0.064) are 
significantly different from zero. Furthermore, in order to scrutinize if the main results generated by Models 3 and 
6 in Table 1 could be driven by a few influential cases, we let HLM create a residual file enabling detection of 
outlying units. We detected 4 suspicious cases for blue-collar employees and 14 for white-collar employees. The 
main results were largely unaltered when we reran the models without these cases. 
12 The formal notation for this expanded model is the following: 
Level-1:   lnwageij = B0j + B1j*WOMij + B2j*EXPij + B3j* EXPSQij +B4j*SENij + B5j*EDUCij + Rij 
Level-2:   B0j = G00 + G01* PROPMALEBOSSj + G 02* PROPWOMENj + G03* lnSIZE j + Goi￿ INDi + U0j 
B1j = G 10 + G 11* PROPMALEBOSSj + U1j 
B2 = G20 + U2j 
B3 = G30 + U3j 
B4 = G40 + U4j 
B5 = G50 + U5j 
13 This rather substantial reduction of the number of organizations has to do with the fact that a certain fraction 
of mainly smaller establishments employs only or almost only relatively old individuals for whom we have no 
data on average grades. Organizations are excluded from the analyses also in cases when they employ people for 
which there are data on average grades, but when the gender composition among these employees is totally  
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skewed (i.e., when 100 percent of them are men or women, respectively). Quite evidently, the probability for 
exclusion on these grounds is greater the smaller the number of employees within an establishment. 